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1. Introduction
Pollution abatement goods and services are now largely supplied by a number of spe-
cialized firms. In 1997, these firms totalled earnings of $350 billion, and this figure has
been projected to double by 2010.1 In some countries, such as Germany, France and the
Netherlands, their activities account for as much as 2% of the annual GDP (Barton 1997).
Unsurprisingly, the “eco-industry” has then become a major topic for industrial policy
and international trade discussions.2 It is also central to most government bodies and in-
stitutions concerned with environmental regulation. Yet, someone will hardly find in the
environmental economics literature an acknowledgement that there even exists such an
industry: pollution abatement is consistently assumed to be set only by polluters, based
in turn on relevant technological, regulatory or output market considerations, but absent
any explicit market or bilateral relationship with actual suppliers. This paper represents
a first attempt to fill this gap.
The basic (textbook) framework to analyze pollution abatement can already be viewed
as a partial equilibrium model involving a representative price-taking polluter who may
procure the needed goods and services on a perfectly competitive market (under no uncer-
1For additional data, see the reports by the European Commission (1999), the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (1992, 1996), and the World Trade Organization (1998).
2In order to collect reliable data and stimulate rigorous analyses, the OECD and the Statistical Oﬃce of
the European Commission (Eurostat) have recently developed the following definition of the environment
industry (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Eurostat 1999): “The environment
industry consists of activities which produce goods and services to measure, prevent, limit, minimize or
correct environmental damage to water, air, and soil, as well as problems related to waste, noise and
eco-systems. These include cleaner technologies, products and services which reduce environmental risk
and minimize pollution and resource use.” Note that pollution abatement accounts for more than 80%
of the industry’s income (Institut Français de l’Environnement 2002).
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tainty, asymmetric information, or capacity constraints). In two companion articles that
focus on trade and environmental policy and that first bring in the eco-industry, Feess
and Muehlheusser (1999, 2002) similarly leave out all strategic actions on the part of en-
vironmental service providers.3 Several empirical studies reveal, however, that significant
segments of the eco-industry, such as waste management, are now dominated by a small
number of large suppliers (Barton 1997; Baumol 1995; Davies 2002). These environment
firms certainly enjoy some market power and matter to each other. To capture such
features, this paper amends the basic framework with the alternative assumption that
pollution abatement goods and services are delivered either by a Cournot oligopoly (sub-
section 4.1) or a monopoly (subsection 4.2).4 In this context, we find that the particular
public policy approach chosen to regulate pollution has a definite influence on the mar-
ket power of environment firms and on the resulting market price of abatement, through
its direct impact on the price-elasticity of demand for pollution-abating services. As a
consequence, an optimal pollution tax should be set higher than the marginal social cost
of damage (otherwise, the elasticity of demand for pollution abatement would be such
3These papers’ objective is to examine whether tighter environmental regulation may benefit a trading
nation. Current wisdom about strategic environmental policy (see, for instance, Barrett 1994) recom-
mends that a tax on emissions be smaller than the marginal social cost of pollution damages (as long as
countries compete in quantities and the commodities sold on international markets are strategic substi-
tutes). Feess and Muehlheusser show that the opposite conclusion may hold, however, in the presence of
an eco-industry where the production of environmental services is subject to a learning curve.
4It might actually have been even more realistic to model the eco-industry as an oligopoly with a
competitive fringe, for in most market segments many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) still provide
specific equipment and services (World Trade Organization 1998). This would have complicated the pre-
sentation, however, without changing our basic message that imperfect competition between abatement
technology suppliers is important for environmental regulation.
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that the relatively higher prices reached under imperfect competition would generate too
little abatement), and a voluntary approach to pollution abatement may be unsuccessful
without the eco-industry’s willingness to participate.
The following section will now present our model. Section 3 next contains a brief
discussion of what first-best production and abatement levels would be. Section 4 - this
paper’s main section - then turns to environmental regulation and successively consid-
ers the two main types of policy instruments - emission-based (i.e., emissions taxes and
quotas) and abatement-based (i.e., design standards and voluntary agreements). Section
5 concludes the paper by discussing some possible extensions of the model and future
research topics.
2. The Model
Before spelling out our model, it is worth recalling a few stylized facts. The eco-industry
can be divided into three broad segments: pollution management, cleaner technologies
and products, and resources management (WTO 1998; OECD/Eurostat 1999). The first
group is by far the most significant in terms of income; it comprises mostly end-of-pipe
activities, such as (in decreasing order of importance) solid waste management, waste wa-
ter treatment, air pollution control, and contaminated soil and groundwater remediation
(European Commission 1999). Competition naturally varies within industry segments
and countries, but in the United States and Germany for instance, environment firms are
generally of a larger size than the national firm average (Barton 1997).5 One rationale
5Ten years ago, for example, Waste Management Technologies already accounted for about 10% of
4
for this is that these firms must currently rely heavily on R&D to compete globally and
keep abreast of rapidly evolving environmental regulations. These pieces of information
should now fix intuition for the model that follows.
2.1. Basic Assumptions
Consider a representative price-taking firm that produces one consumption good while
emitting one pollutant. The current price of the consumption good is P , and the pro-
duction cost associated with an output level x is denoted as C(x). This cost function is
assumed twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and convex.
The firm’s emission level is given by the function e(x,w), wherew represents abatement
eﬀort. This emission function is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and such that ex > 0
(production generates pollution), ew < 0 (abatement eﬀort reduces pollution), exx ≥ 0
(the more the firm produces, the more the last unit delivered pollutes), and eww > 0 (there
are decreasing returns to abatement). In a manner similar to Barnett (1980), Katsoulacos
and Xepapadeas (1995), and Farzin and Kort (2001), for instance, we shall focus on end-
of-pipe pollution abatement. We therefore assume that e(x,w) is also additively separable,
i.e., exw = 0, for an investment in end-of-pipe abatement does not modify the production
process and so does not aﬀect the amount of pollution imputable to each unit produced.
Like Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1995), let us suppose, furthermore, that the function
ew(w)w is decreasing in w, which means that the emission function is not too convex in
w. All these assumptions would be satisfied if, for example, e(x,w) = kx−
√
Lw, where
total eco-industry earnings in the United States and rivaled the aircraft manufacturer Lockheed in size
(Karliner 1994).
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k and L are positive real numbers.6
2.2. Enters the Eco-Industry
Now, let the abatement goods and services be delivered by an eco-industry. An individual
supplier i incurs a costG(wi) for producing a quantity wi of abatement goods and services,
where G(·) is twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, convex, and such that G0(0) = 0.
In the simplest setting, the eco-industry is made of n identical firms competing à la
Cournot. The case where n = 1 corresponds to a monopoly, while making n→∞ captures
perfect competition. The market for abatement is characterized by an inverse demand
function q(w), where w stands for total purchases of abatement goods and services. Firm
i’s profits are then
Πi = q(w)wi −G(wi) , i = 1, ..., n ,
and the first-order condition for profit maximization is precisely7
∂q
∂w
wi + q(w)−G0(wi) = 0 , i = 1, ..., n . (1)
Since all environment firms are similar, we have that wi = wn at an equilibrium.
8 Let
6Formally, the function e(x,w) could take negative values. However, the quantity of pollution gener-
ated by a firm being necessarily positive or equal to zero, we only consider levels of x and w at which
e(x,w) is positive. This amounts to suppose that the firm never abates more than it pollutes, which is
always true at an equilibrium.
7Given our assumptions, first-order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient wherever they appear.
8We suppose that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists and is unique. This is ensured when the profit
functions Πi are concave in wi, i.e., when we have ∂
2q
∂w2wi + 2
∂q
∂w −G00 ≤ 0 .
6
w0 = ∂w
∂q
; equation (1) can now be re-written as
q(w) = G0(wi)−
w
n
.
1
w0
, i = 1, ..., n . (2)
When the number of environment firms n gets large, the price q paid by the polluting
firm for each unit of abatement approximates the marginal cost. This is the situation as-
sumed implicitly throughout the environmental economics literature. In general, however,
since w0 is negative (this is proven in section 4), equation (2) reveals that q(w) > G0(wi),
so the market price of abatement must exceed the marginal abatement cost. This is a
well-known outcome of Cournot competition (or any form of imperfect competition). Also
well-known is that the diﬀerence between q(w) and G0(wi) - which reflects the environ-
ment firms market power - decreases with the price-elasticity of demand for abatement.9
We shall soon see how various policy instruments aﬀect this elasticity.
3. First-Best Abatement
Abatement eﬀorts are motivated, first of all, by the negative contribution of pollution to
social well-being. Without loss of generality, let the level of social prejudice D increase
linearly with the amount of emissions, i.e., D = νe(x,w) with some positive coeﬃcient v.
Social welfare is now the sum of consumers’ surplus, the polluter’s and the eco-industry’s
9Note that w0 = εwq , where ε denotes the price-elasticity of demand.
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profits, and the social damage due to pollution:
W =
Z x
0
P (u)du− C(x)− qw + qw − nG(w
n
)− ve(x,w). (3)
The first-order conditions for welfare maximization are then
P (x∗)− C 0(x∗)− vex(x∗) = 0, (4)
−G0(w
∗
n
)− vew(w∗) = 0. (5)
According to (4), the price of the consumption good should embed the marginal cost of
producing this good plus the marginal social damage associated with it. And according
to (5), abatement goods should also be delivered, up to the level w∗ where the marginal
cost G0(w
∗
n
) of the eco-industry equals the marginal social benefit of abatement −vew(w∗).
The social welfare objective given by (3), however, makes the eco-industry’s revenue
and the polluting firm’s abatement expenses cancel. All transactions over abatement
goods and services were thereby ignored. But if the polluting firm is left to maximize its
profits, i.e., to solve
max
x,w
π = Px− C(x)− qw ,
it will surely select the output level x0 where the marginal production cost C 0(x0) equals
the market price P of the consumption good, while setting its abatement orders at w0 = 0.
Without further regulatory intervention, there would therefore be no market for abatement.
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4. Regulation
Environmental regulation not only creates a potential market for pollution-abating tech-
nologies, it also aﬀects the market power of environment firms. To see this, let us now
successively consider some standard policy instruments.
4.1. Emission-Based Instruments
Suppose that the regulator introduces a tax t per unit of emission. The profit-maximizing
polluter now behaves as if solving
max
x,w
πt = Px− C(x)− qw − te(x,w) ,
so the output and abatement levels will be such that
P − C 0(xt)− tex(xt) = 0, (6)
−q − tew(wt) = 0. (7)
To satisfy the latter, the polluting firm is then willing to invest in abatement.
By Cramer’s rule, equations (6) and (7) imply that the price-derivative of demand for
abating services is precisely
w0t =
∂wt
∂q
= − 1
teww
. (8)
Since the second-order derivative eww is strictly positive, w0t is negative; this indicates
that, as naturally expected, the polluter’s abatement purchases decrease when the price
9
of the abating goods and services goes up. The magnitude of w0t first depends on the
convexity of the emission function with respect to abatement eﬀort: if eww increases, then
w0t decreases. This means that, as abatement measures become more eﬀective (at the
margin), the polluter’s demand for abatement goods and services is less sensitive to their
price. What seems important from a policy standpoint, furthermore, is that a larger tax
rate t would similarly bring w0t closer to zero. In other words: when the tax on pollutant
emissions goes up, demand for abatement becomes less price-elastic.
Assuming the regulator is benevolent, the tax level will now be set in order to maximize
the following social welfare function:
W t =
Z xt
0
P (u)du− C(xt)− qwt − te(xt, wt) + nqw
t
n
− nG(w
t
n
)− ve(xt, wt) + te(xt, wt).
Straightforward algebra reduces this expression to10
W t =
Z xt
0
P (u)du− C(xt)− nG(w
t
n
)− ve(xt, wt).
It can be shown (see the appendix) that the first-order condition for welfare maximization
with respect to t then yields
t∗ = v[
ex(x
t)dx
t
dt
+ ew(w
t)dw
t
dt
ex(xt)
dxt
dt
+ [w
teww
n
+ ew(wt)]
dwt
dt
] . (9)
10This simplification amounts, of course, to supposing that tax revenues are transfered and redistributed
in a neutral way.
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Standard comparative statics via equations (6) and (7) entails that dx
t
dt
< 0 and dw
t
dt
> 0;
the latter’s numerator is therefore negative. And since ew(w)w is decreasing by assump-
tion, we have that
weww + ew(w) < 0,
so
wteww
n
+ ew(w
t) < 0,
which implies that the denominator in (9) is also negative. The optimal tax rate is thus
positive. Moreover, notice that w
teww
n
dwt
dt
> 0. The coeﬃcient of ν in the above expression
is then greater than 1, so t∗ > v. This finding constitutes our first proposition.
Proposition 1: When abatement goods and services are supplied by environment firms
competing à la Cournot, the optimal pollution tax must be larger than the marginal social
damage of emissions.
Observe that, when the number of environment firms n grows, the coeﬃcient of ν tends
to one.11 As competition within the eco-industry increases, the optimal tax on emissions
then approximates the marginal prejudice caused by the polluting activity. Proposition 1
is therefore consistent with Pigou (1920)’s classical result.
The proposition nevertheless contrasts with several streams of the current literature,
notably with the one that postulates an imperfectly competitive polluting industry. Under
a polluting monopoly, or when polluting firms are identical and their number is exogenous
11This conclusion obtains from the presence of the term w
teww
n in (9). It therefore remains valid if eww
goes to zero instead.
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(as in the actual setting), it has indeed been shown that the optimal emission tax falls
short of the marginal damage cost (see Buchanan 1969; Barnett 1980; and Katsoulacos and
Xepapadeas 1995).12 The intuitive rationale for departing from these standard results runs
as follows. When the eco-industry is imperfectly competitive, the price of abatement goods
and services will be larger than their marginal cost. In this case (comparing equations
(5) and (7)), if the tax t was to be set equal to the marginal damage υ, then the polluter
would settle for an abatement level that is too small relative to the first-best w∗. In order
to lessen this distortion, the regulator must then tax pollutant emissions more severely.13
In the present context, we can show that a quota on emissions is equivalent to an
emission tax, in the sense that it leads to the same output level and abatement expenses.
Our analysis of emission-based instruments is then complete. Let us now consider the
alternative set of policy instruments.
4.2. Abatement-Based Instruments
Abatement-based regulation is sometimes preferred to an approach centered on emis-
sions. It may be diﬃcult, for instance, to precisely measure a polluter’s emissions, as in
farming and fishing where non-point source pollution is frequent. The regulator would
then rely on policy instruments which target the means a potential polluter is commit-
12Otherwise, the pollution tax would exacerbate the allocative ineﬃciency (i.e., the under-production)
due to imperfect competition. Note that this recommendation can be revised if polluting firms are
diﬀerent or their number is endogenous (Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas 1995; Long and Soubeyran 1999).
13As in Buchanan (1969) and Barnett (1980) celebrated work, the optimal tax t∗ balances the desire
to give stronger incentives to abatement with the necessity to limit the contraction of output. Of course,
these two distortions could be simultaneously alleviated so that first-best production and abatement
levels are implemented if the regulator could combine several policy instruments. This issue is briefly
considered in the conclusion of this paper.
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ted to take to reduce pollution. This section successively investigates two such instru-
ments: design standards and voluntary agreements. For simplicity, but without impairing
our qualitative conclusions, we assume throughout that n = 1 so the eco-industry is a
monopoly.
4.2.1 Design Standards
To curtail polluting emissions (of sulfure dioxide, say), the regulator can mandate some
specific abatement technologies (such as a particular family of scrubbers). In the present
model, this command-and-control approach amounts to impose a given abatement level
_
w. We suppose that this design standard can be perfectly and costlessly enforced.
In the standard textbook framework,
_
w is chosen in order to maximize the social
welfare function
W =
Z x
0
P (u)du− C(x)− qDw + qDw −G(w)− ve(x,w) (10)
with respect to w, subject to the polluting industry’s willingness to produce and to the
polluters’ and environment firms’ respective profit-maximization conditions
P (x)− C(x)− qw ≥ 0 , (11)
C 0(x) = P , (12)
G0(w) = qD . (13)
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Clearly, the first-best abatement level w∗ defined in (5) is implemented if it is feasible,
but according to (12) the polluting firm produces up to its absolute profit-maximizing
level x0 > x∗.
Under a single abatement supplier, however, constraint (13) must be replaced with
qDw −G(w) ≥ 0 , and (14)
qD maximizes qw −G(w) subject to (11) and (12) , (15)
which respectively capture the environment firm’s willingness to participate and profit-
maximizing behavior. Provided (14) holds, these new conditions do not aﬀect the regula-
tor’s choice of standard or the polluters’ production eﬀort, which can respectively remain
at w∗ and x0, but (15) entails that the polluters’ participation constraint (11) will always
be binding. This observation yields a second proposition.
Proposition 2: If the regulator enforces a design standard while abatement goods and
services are supplied by a monopoly, then the polluting firms’ profits are brought to zero.
This statement tends to explain why mandatory design standards often meet with
strong resistance on the part of polluters. The latter would then lobby the regulator so
that a price ceiling on abatement goods and services be also enforced or the current policy
be simply abandoned.14
14Specific political economy issues raised by the presence of an eco-industry are further discussed in
the conclusion of this paper.
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4.2.2 The Voluntary Agreement
An alternative abatement-based approach that has become quite common over the last
decade is the voluntary agreement. In practice, this approach can take various forms (see
the OECD 1999 report). The one we shall consider here is often encountered in Europe:
the regulator makes the polluter a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer wV on its abatement level, while
threatening to impose an emission tax τ if this proposal is rejected.15
Compared with the design standard, the opportunity the polluter now has to select
between achieving a fixed abatement level or being free to choose one under a given
pollution tax certainly increases the price-elasticity of demand for abatement and limits
the environment firm’s market power. If the market price of abatement is too high,
the polluting firm can always reduce its orders and submit itself to the emission tax.
This inherent flexibility of the voluntary agreement seems to clearly justify its growing
popularity and the corresponding decline of command-and-control approaches. But let us
examine the situation more carefully.
In the usual textbook setting, the oﬀer wV has to maximize the social welfare function
W V =
Z x
0
P (u)du− C(x)−G(w)− ve(x,w) (16)
15Formally, the extensive form of the game is the following. First, the regulator makes an abatement
proposal wV . Next, polluters accept or refuse the regulator’s oﬀer. If they accept, wV is enforced; if not,
then the regulator raises a tax τ per unit of polluting emissions, and the polluters and the eco-industry
adjust to it. Subgame perfection requires that τ be set in order to maximize the regulator’s objective
W t =
R xt
0
P (u)du − C(xt) − G(wt) − ve(xt, wt) with respect to t, where xt and wt are determined by
the polluters’ and the environment firms’ respective profit maximization under t. Hence, τ = υ when the
eco-industry is perfectly competitive, and τ = t∗ when it is a Cournot oligopoly.
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with respect to w, subject to the polluting industry’s willingness to accept and to the
polluters’ and environment firms’ respective profit-maximization conditions
Px− C(x)− qVw ≥ Pxτ − C(xτ)− qτwτ − τe(xτ , wτ) , (17)
C 0(x) = P , C 0(xτ) + τex(xτ) = P , − τew(wτ) = qτ , (18)
G0(w) = qV , G0(wτ) = qτ . (19)
Again, we have that the polluters’ output xV = x0, so as much of the consumption good
is produced as in a situation with no environmental regulation. Notice, however, that the
right-hand side of (17) is greater than or equal to zero, so the regulator’s choice set can be
smaller than under command-and-control. This may not allow the first-best abatement
level w∗ to be implemented voluntarily.
If the eco-industry is a monopoly, however, the incentive constraint (19) changes into
qV maximizes ΠV = qw −G(w) subject to (11) and (18), and (20)
qτ maximizes Πτ = qwτ −G(wτ) subject to (11) and (18). (21)
On the one hand, condition (21) relaxes the participation constraint (17) by decreasing
the value of its right-hand side. This reflects that an emission tax now constitutes a
stronger threat, which leaves the regulator greater chances to achieve w∗. On the other
hand, the monopolistic price qV set under (20) will usually be so high as to violate (17)
16
and deter any agreement with the regulator. To fix this, the latter may authorize polluters
to renege on a promised abatement level if the environment firm charges too high a price.
The following conditions must then substitute for condition (20):
qV maximizes ΠV = qw −G(w) subject to (17) and (18) , and (200)
ΠV ≥ Πτ . (22)
According to these, the environment firm will maximize its profits without jeopardizing
the voluntary scheme (condition (200)), provided it is better oﬀ under this scheme than
under an emission tax (condition (22)). This conclusion supports our last proposition.
Proposition 3. In the presence of a monopolistic eco-industry, a voluntary agreement
is feasible only if the environment firm is also willing to participate.
Clearly, under (200) the participation constraint (17) will be binding, so polluters end
up being indiﬀerent between accepting the regulator’s proposal or opting for the emission
tax. As opposed to the command-and-control situation, however, the polluters’ profits
may now be strictly positive.
5. Concluding Remarks
Prices polluters pay to alleviate environmental damages are currently often determined on
market segments dominated by a few large suppliers of abatement technologies. While this
fact is widely acknowledged in environmental policy discussions, environmental economics
still provides little guidance on how to precisely regulate polluting activities in this context.
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This paper first seeked to convey the message that imperfect competition between
environment firms does matter for environmental regulation. Accordingly, we amended
the basic (textbook) setting - which involves a representative price-taking polluter and
no uncertainty or asymmetric information - by now making the polluting firm acquire
abatement goods and services from only one supplier or from many identical suppliers
competing à la Cournot. We then showed that taxes on emissions would have to be
adjusted upward, and that a voluntary agreement on abatement eﬀorts may not be doable
if the eco-industry is reluctant to support it.
The present analysis could be extended in various ways. Other policy instruments
- such as abatement subsidies, tradable emission permits, performance standards, and
diﬀerent voluntary schemes - should be considered. Additional segments of the envi-
ronment industry (cleaner technologies and product; ressources management) could be
brought in (at the cost of dropping our assumption that the emission function e(x,w) is
additively separable). There could be imperfect competition between polluters as well.16
Other modes of competition than Cournot could be studied. Entry and exit in the end
product sector and in the eco-industry could be made endogenous. Polluting and environ-
ment firms could be heterogenous. And environment firms could be endowed with private
information about the cost (or the quality) of their abatement goods and services.17
16Intuitively, since Cournot competition between polluters and between abatement suppliers entails
that optimal emission taxes are respectively lower and higher than the marginal social cost of pollution
damage, simultaneous Cournot competition in both the product and the abatement industries would bring
such taxes closer to the Pigouvian level. A formal demonstration of this can be found in Nimubona and
Sinclair-Desgagné (2005).
17This extension may not constitute a straightforward application of the actual literature on vertical
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This paper has focused on the specific form to be taken by some environmental policy
instruments in the presence of an oligopolistic eco-industry. An immediate research direc-
tion from here would be the comparison of regulatory approaches. At this point, it can be
said that when the market for abatement goods and services is perfectly competitive, the
optimal emission tax implements the first-best, while a voluntary approach to pollution
abatement remains a second-best instrument (because the output x0 chosen by a polluter
is larger than the socially optimal level). When the eco-industry is imperfectly compet-
itive and exercises market power, however, taxing pollution also becomes a second-best
policy. Moreover, we have that w∗ ≥ wV > wt∗ and x0 = xV > xt∗ ; so the abatement level
achieved through a voluntary agreement is higher than the one reachable via a pollution
tax (it can even attain the first-best), but the amount of the consumption good produced
under a voluntary agreement exceeds the first-best one. It is thus impossible to rank,
for all existing cases, an emission tax or quota above or below a voluntary agreement in
terms of social welfare. Yet, an unambiguous ranking of policy instruments can be found
for specialized versions of the present model.18
Related to this topic is the appropriate combination of policy instruments to correct
simultaneously for the pollution externality and the output distortion due to imperfect
relationships and outsourcing (see, for instance, Perry 1989; or Mookherjee 2003), for the abatement
services provided by environment firms are meant to correct a negative externality and are often not
embedded in the consumption good.
18For example, using the functions P (x) = 1 − x, C(x) = 12x2, G(w) = gw (g > 0), and e(x,w) =
kx −
√
Lw (k > 0, L > 0), where the parameter g represents the marginal production cost of the eco-
industry, k is the amount of emissions generated by one unit of the consumption good, and L captures
the eﬃciency of the available abatement goods and services. Computations can be obtained from the
authors upon request.
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competition. To be sure, imposing a standard w∗ together with an emission tax that
brings about an output level x∗ would achieve the first-best. But as argued by Carraro
and Metcalf (2001), administrative costs and political constraints may leave regulators
with an incomplete set of instruments to choose from. Moreover, policy coordination
between various government bodies (the environmental protection and antitrust agencies,
for example) is often far from guaranteed and deserves closer scrutiny.
In practice, the design of environmental policy is also subject to pressures from public
opinion and industrial lobbies.19 The latter are now likely to include some powerful envi-
ronment firms. Complete theoretical analysis of the political economy of environmental
regulation should therefore try to capture the eco-industry’s influence in regulatory deci-
sions. The upshot might exhibit some mixed intervention strategies of the type studied
by Cadot and Sinclair-Desgagné (1995), which balance the interests of polluters for lower
compliance costs with those of environmental firms for greater needs of their specific goods
and services.
Finally, renewed attention should be given to the eﬀect of environmental policy on
technological change, taking into account the specific role played by the eco-industry.20
The relative advantage of market-based instruments over direct regulation in providing
incentives to adopt new technologies might have to be revised downward, as the desire of
competing environment firms to innovate might be enhanced, for instance, under “Best
19See, for instance, Boyer and Laﬀont (1999), and the essays collected in Stavins (2004).
20Jaﬀe et al. (2002) provide a good survey of the issues and contributions pertaining to environmental
regulation and technological change.
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Available Control Technology” regulations. The eco-industry might also bring down the
cost of technological updating (through the learning-curve eﬀect pointed out by Feess, E.,
and G. Muehlheusser (2002), for example) and benefit from spreading new standards and
know-how, thereby accelerating the diﬀusion of cleaner technologies.
Appendix: The Optimal Pollution Tax - Equation (9)
Total diﬀerentiation of W t yields:
dW t
dt
= [P (xt)− C 0(xt)]dx
t
dt
−G0(w
t
n
)
dwt
dt
− v[ex(xt)
dxt
dt
+ ew(w
t)
dwt
dt
] . (A.1)
Since, by (5) and (6),
−G0(w
t
n
) = −q(wt)− w
t
n
.
1
w0t
and P − C 0(xt) = tex(xt) ,
(A.1) is equivalent to:
dW t
dt
= tex(x
t)
dxt
dt
+ [−q(wt)− w
t
w0t
.
1
n
]
dwt
dt
− v[ex(xt)
dxt
dt
+ ew(w
t)
dwt
dt
]. (A.2)
Recalling from (7) and (8) that −q(wt) = tew(wt) and −w
t
w0t
= wtteww , (A.2) now becomes
dW t
dt
= tex(x
t)
dxt
dt
+ [ew(w
t) +
wteww
n
]t
dwt
dt
− v[ex(xt)
dxt
dt
+ ew(w
t)
dwt
dt
] .
Setting the latter equal to 0 gives equation (9).
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